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1. Introduction 
The Arabic category of Number presents a major challenge w the formal 
semanticist. In addition to a singular, a dual, and a plural, Arabic has a collective 
and a singulative as well as a multal and a paucal. In addition to this, Arnhic has 
two categories which arc pcrplexingly called "the plural of the plural" and "the dual 
of the plural". The purpose of the present paper is to use the semantics of individu-
ation proposed in Ojeda (in press) to provide the complex number distinctions of 
Arabic with a precise interpretation. It will be seen that the proposals made in this 
paper agree rather well with the observations and intuitions of traditional grammar-
ians, especially with the ones collected in the monumental Arabic Grammar of 
Mortimer Howell. 
Let us begin hy assuming without argument that we arc given a s.::t on which 
to base our semantics for Arabic Number. This set will be called tht· universe nf 
discourse. It will also be called£. If the universe of discourse has any elements, 
they will be said to be individuals or, more properly, the individuals of the univrrse 
of discourse. 
Let us tum now to kinds and their instances. Let us turn, that is, to objects 
like the one denoted by the computer in (la) and to object, like the one denoted by 
the compurer in (lb). 
(I) a. Turing invented the computer. 
b. Turing repaired the computer. 
It has been argued in Carlson (I 978), that both kinds and their instances are 
individuals of the universe of discourse. This means that any relation between kinds 
and their instances will be a relation between elements of the universe of discourse. 
Consider in particular the relation of instantiation. This is the relation which an 
individual bears to a kind just in case the individual is an instance of the kind. The 
object denoted by the compuier in (I b) thus bears the relation of instantiation to the 
object denoted by the computer in (Ia). 
The relation of instantiation allows us to define a number of notions which 
will prove essential to our goals. It will allow us to say, for example, that two kinds 
overlap just in case they have a common instance. More formally, let us use 'S:' to 
refer to the relation of instantiation. We define: 
----------···--·-~ 
* I am indebted to Ali Alalou for his intuitions and for his patience in reviewing lhe data with 
me. I am also indebted to Donka Farka.~. Steven Lapointe, and lhe anonymous SALT II readers for 
comments. 
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(2) 	 For all x, y E £: x overlaps y if and only if there exists some z E £ such that 
z $ x and z $ y. 
The relation of instantiation will allow us further definitions. Let us say that a given 
set of individuals constitutes a kind (or, conversely, that a kind is constituted by a 
given set of individuals) just if two conditions hold. One is that all the individuals in 
the set arc instances of the kind; the other is that every instance of the kind overlaps 
some clement or other of the given set. More formally, let w, x, y, z he arbitrary 
element~ of E. We define: 
(3) 	 For all F r:;;;,E: F constitutes a kind x if and only if 
(i) y E F implies y $ x. 
(ii) z $ x implies that there exist\ some w E F such that z overlaps w. 
We may now state the central assumption on which this paper is based. It is 
that the universe of discourse must satisfy the following properties when taken in 
conjunction with the relation of instantiation. 
(4) 	 TRANSITIVITY: For all X, y,;: E E: x s; v and vs; z jointly imply that x s; z. 
COMPLETENESS: 	For all Fr:;;;,E: If Fis not empty, then there exists exactly 
one x E E which is a kind constituted hy F. 
More succinctly, the assumption is that, when taken together, the universe of dis-
course and the relation of instantiation form a mereologv. 1 Since a mercology is 
structurally indistinguishable from the positive portion of a complete boolean alge-
bra (cf. Tarski 1956h, 33311), our central assumption is a direct descendant of pro-
posals made in Link ( 1983). The main differL'.nce between our views of the universe 
of discourse is that we have chosen to interpret the panial order of the said algebra 
as the relation of instantiation. 
To illustrate our central assumption, we should first introduce some useful 
notation. Thus, if some set F constitutes a kind, then we shall feel free to useL( F) 
to refer to that kind. Notice that the functional notation is appropriate here since 
subsets constitute at most one kind each. Moreover, if a finite set {a, h. c, ... , nj 
constitutes a kind, then we may also choose to use a+h+c+ ... +n to refer to that 
kind. 
Let us now turn to (5). This is a diagram for a universe of discourse which 
forn1s a mcreology when taken in conjunction with a relation of instantiation. The 
universe of discourse is the sel {a, h, c, ri+h, a+c, h+c, 11+h+cj. The rl'.!alion of 
1 Mcrcologies were Jirst ddi11ed hy Stanislaw Lesniewski 111 the early part of tJ1is century as an 
alicrnative to set theory. The formulation adopted in this paper is due to Tarski (l<J'ifo). Mcreo-
logics have hecn used a, theories ol lhc relation between pans ,uHI wholes. Wt· !-.hall re1n::Un neutral 
as to whcthn tl11' should he so. As to sets, they have been used above and will continue to he used 
throughout tl1is paper. Sec Simons ( I '!87) tor a thorough ,hsrnssHm ol mcrcolog1cs. 
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instantiation is such that if x and y arc two distinct individuals of the universe of 
discourse, then xis an instance of y just in case an upward path from x to y can be 
followed in (5). 
(5) a+b+c 
A
a+b a+c b+c 
tx)<] 
a b C 
To make the illustration more concrete, let us suppose that a, b, and c are 
computers. This means that a+b+c is computerkind -the kind constituted by the 
set of computers of the universe of discourse.2 Let us moreover suppose that a and 
bare digital computers, that a and c arc big computers and that band care powerful 
computers. It now follows that a+b is the kind constituted by the set of digital 
computers, that a+c is the kind constituted by the set of big computers, and that b+c 
is the kind constituted by the set of powerful computers. 
Interestingly, it also follows that a is the kind constituted by {a}, the set of 
big digital computers, that b is the kind constituted by {b}, the set of powerful 
digital computers, and that c is the kind constituted by {c}, the set of big powerful 
computers. This means that a, b, c are literally sui gene ris individuals; they are 
kinds onto themselves. But all seven elements of our universe of discourse are by 
definition individuals. We may therefore want to distinguish sui generis individuals 
by calling them proper individuals (of the universe ofdiscourse). But by complete-
ness all seven elements of our universe of discourse arc also kinds --even if some 
of them are kinds onto themselves. We may therefore want to invoke another 
distinction and set apart a+b, a+c, b+c, and a+b+c by calling them proper kinds ( of 
the universe ofdiscourse)) 
Natural languages arc sensitive to the propriety of kinds and individuals. As 
seen in ( 1 ), verbs like invent select proper kinds, while verbs like repair select 
proper individuals. As shown by (6), similar distinctions are acknowledged by 
adjectives like dead and extinct. 
(6) a. The dodo is extinct. 
---·-·-···--------
2 We follow Quine ( 1969) in using the convenient morphological expedient of -kind suffixation. 
3 Technically, a proper individual can be defined as a kind which lacks proper instances -which 
is to say as a kind which lacks instances olher than itself. Proper kinds can be defined as lhosc 
elements of the universe of discourse which are not proper individuals. 
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b. The dodo is dead. 
For indeed, if successful, the dodo in (6a) refers to the proper kind constituted by 
all the dodos in the universe of discourse while the dodo in (6b) refers to the proper 
individual which is also constituted by all the dodos in the universe of discourse. 
The distinction between "kinds" and "objects" widely made in the literature thus 
emerges in the present context as a distinction between proper kinds and proper 
individuals. 
2. The Collective 
The collective nnuns nf Arabic are basic lexical items which indicate either "a 
substance or material in the mass", or else "a collection of objects viewed as a 
totality without reference to the individual members" (Erwin 1963, 166). The Iraqi 
dialect of Arabie contains, for example, collectives like beer) 'eggs (in general)', 
xishab 'wood', and dijaaj 'chich:n (viewL:d as a kind of food) or chickens (as a 
species)'. Given the assumptions formulatL:d in the preceding section, a proposal 
concerning the collective of Arabic can now bL: advanced. It will take the form of a 
constraint on the interpretation of collective nouns or, more accurately, on the 
interpretation of nonvacuous collective nouns.4 The constraint reads as follows. 
(7) 	 Every collective noun denotes, if anything, a singleton subset of the universe 
of discourse. 
To illustratL', kt us suggL'St that bee<} denotes (ej, where e is cggkind, the kind 
constituted by the set of eggs in the universe of discourse. Along similar lines, 
xislu1b would denote ( u), where w is woodkind, the kind constituted by the set of 
portions of wood in the universe of discourse. As to dijaaj, the facts arc more 
interesting. When it means 'chickens (as a species)', it will denote (,I where c 
stands for chiekenkind, the kind constituted by the set of chickens in the universe of 
discourse. But when it means 'chicken (viewed as a kind of food)', it will denote 
'chicken-food-kind', the singleton which contains thL: kind constituted by the set of 
portions of chickrn food. In fact, it may drnotl'. (111( c)J, where m is the function 
which assigns, to each individual, the mass which makes it up (cf. the 
materialization function of Link 1983). 
The semantics of collectives we have just proposed seems to correspond 
closely to intuition. As WL'. have SL:rn, Erwin ( 1963, 166) takes collectives to denote 
"substances" or "collections of objects viL:wcd as a totality". Along thl'. same linL:s, 
Talmoudi (1980, 132) regards the collective as denoting cithn "a collcctivl'. of 
things or animals regarded as a unit", or else "a mass or a volume", Wright ( 193.\ 
147) describes the collective as expressing "the grnus or whole", and Abdcl-Massih 
4 To ea,c exposition we will indulge in the tenninological abuse ol saying that a noun is vacuous 
(or that it !ails to denote anything) ii and only if it denotes the empty subset of the universe. 
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ct aL (1979, 49) define the coll cc ti ve as a noun that designates "a class or mass of 
like things without counting the units that make up the mass"; it is "the mass 
wherein the individuality of the 'amassed' is effaced" Fleisch (1961, §65b). The 
collective, then, "denotes the species as a whole" (Harrell 1962, 78); it has "generic 
reference" (Holes 1990, 149). 
But it might be thought that collectives should simply denote kinds, not the 
singletons of kinds. This move seems unadvisablc. If noncollective nouns are to 
denote sets, then we cannot assign all nouns a unified semantic type. Collectives 
would denote type-zero denotations (elements of the universe of discourse) while 
noncollectives would denote type-one denotations (subsets of the universe of dis-
course). What is more, this type hranching in the nominal system would have a 
wide ranging rippling effect; it would force the systems of nominal spccifiers and 
complements to branch accordingly in order to combine meaningfully with their 
heads. 
To gauge the strength of (7) let us recall that collectives are nouns, and that 
nouns denote subscL~ of the universe of discourse. Now, any universe of discourse 
with n clements will of course have 2° subsets. Of these, only n can be collective 
denotations ( one for each clement). Thus, the universe of discourse in (5) h;1s 27 "' 
128 different subsets. Only seven of them, however, can serve as the denotation of 
a collective. They arc {a/. fbJ. [c/, {a+b}, [a+c}, {b+c}, {a+b+cj. The set of 
possible denotations for a collective noun is thus drastically reduced by the cons-
traint in (7). 
3. The Singulative 
Singulative nouns arc lexical items which are derived from collectives and 
refer either to "a specific 4uantity of the substance", or else to "an individual mem-
ber of the collection·· dcnot.,;d by the collective they ,k,ivc from. Thus. in the Iraqi 
dialect of Arabic, the collective beei) 'eggs (in general)' corresponds to the singul-
ative beei)a '(an) egg'; the collective xishab 'wood' corresponds to the singulative 
xishba 'piece of wood', and the collective dijaaj 'chicken (viewed as a kind of food) 
or chickens (as a spe,ies)' ..:orresponds to the singulative dijaaja '(an individual) 
chicken' (Erwin 1963, 166). 
Along the same lines. Brockdmann ( 1960, §66b) pointed out that the 
singulative ending "is sometimes attached to a noun with general meaning in order 
to mark a singularity (ein Einze/nes)". According to Harrell (1962, 78), "to indicate 
one member of the general category referred to by thl~ collective, a singular is 
fom1ed by adding the feminine ending -11". For Cowl'II (1964. 297), "a singulativc 
noun designates an individual unit or instance of what its underlying noun desig-
nates collectively or in general". 5 
5 'Ihc term "siogulative" is attrihute<.I to Zeuss (1853, 299), who used it to refer to the category 
of noun, which stood in opposition to the rnllcctive in Celtic. The singulativc is called ?ismu '/-
308 
But what, exactly, should the singulative denote? ln light of the foregoing, the 
answer might seem clear: a singulative should denote a set of proper individuals -
indeed, the set of proper individuals which instantiate the kind denoted by its 
collective base. Thus, if the universe of discourse is as diagramed in (5), and if a, 
b, c were eggs rather than computers, then the denotation of the collective beet) 
'eggs' and the singulativc beei}a '(an) egg' would be as follows. 
(8) A
a+b a+c b+c 
= [bee00 J 
But a prohlem for this analysis arises as soon as we leave count collectives like 
beer) ·eggs' and move onto mass collectives like xishab 'wood'. For, suppose that 
mass kinds are characterized by the fact that they can never be instantiated by proper 
individuals.6 After all, mass nouns have been characterized as nouns which do not 
carry with them criteria for the individuation of their reference. lf this is so. then 
singulatives like xishba 'piece of wood' would have to denote the empty set in 
every universe of discourse, and thus be illformed on semantic grounds. More 
generally, the singulatives of mass collectives would all be contradictory. 
To avoid such an obviously incorrect prediction, let us suppose that we were 
to take a kind and split it into a set of nonoverlapping instances. We will say that 
this set is a partition of the kind in question. To be more precise, we will say that a 
subset of a universe of discourse counts as a partition if the subset meets two con-
ditions. One is that no two clements of the subset overlap in the sense of (2). The 
other is that the subset constitutes the kind in question in the sense of (3} Let us 
suppose, for example, that all the wood in the universe of discourse is contained in 
a pile of logs. Clearly, the logs in the pile do not overlap, as they have no common 
part~. Moreover, these logs constitute wood in this universe. We may therefore say 
that the set containing these logs constitutes woodkind in the chosen universe. 
As we sec it, every singulative noun denotes a partition. To be more specific, 
a partition of the kind denoted by its corresponding collective. Thus xishba 'piece 
of wood' will denote a partition of woodkind -say the set of logs in the pile. We 
wa/lllati by traditional Arab grammarians and nomen unitatis vel individua/itatis 'noun of unity or 
individuality' by their Western followers (cf. Greenberg 1977, 287f). 
See Ojeda (in press) for arguments that mass nouns denote kinds which are deprived of proper 
individuals. 
6 
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arc then ahlc to interpret this singulative without assuming a set of individual 
instances of wood (thus renouncing to an attractive analysis of mass nouns). All we 
need is a set of mutually exdusive and jointly exhaustive instances of wood. 
It should not escape the reader that if we have an individuation for a kind, 
then we also have a partition for the kind, as every set of proper individuals is a set 
of nonoverlapping instances (if two distinct instances overlap, then they have at 
least one instance other than themselves, namely their overlap). It is therefore 
consistent with our proposals to claim that beei)a '(an) egg' denotes a set of proper 
individuals -that is to say an individuation. The proposal in terms of partitions is a 
generalization of the proposal in terms of individuations. 
But it might he thought that the proposal is too general. L<.:t k he a kind in our 
universe of discourse. Suppose there is some collective which denotes {k}. If k is a 
proper kind, then it will have more than one partition. In fact, it will probahly have 
many, as the number of partitions of a kind grows exponentially with its number of 
individual instances. And if k lacks an individuation, then it will have uncountably 
many partitions. 7 It follows that kinds exhihit what might be called a severe 
indeterminacy ofpartition. The question thus arises as to whether all the pa1titions 
of a kind arc potential denotations of a singulativc. Docs nominal semantics reflect 
the severe indeterminacy involved in the panition of a kind? 
To fix intuitions, let (5) be our universe of discourse and let a+b+c again be 
the kind of eggs c0ntained therein. It can be shown that this kind has the five 
pa1titions listed in (9). Of these, (9e) is the only denotation for bee?Ja, '(an) egg' we 
have so far considered. May bee?Ja, denote (9a)-(9d) as well? 
(9) a. {a+b+c} 
b. {a, b+c} 
c. {b, a+c} 
d. {c, a+bj 
e. {a, b, cj 
As we see it, the 4ucstion should he answen:d in the affirmative. Notice that each 
partition of a kind represents a different way of splitting a kind into subkinds. The 
question then becomes whether a singulative can refer to an arbitrary split of a kind 
into subkinds. But as far as I can see. it can. In any event, this would not be limited 
lO Arabic. English may use a singular like swr or animal to refer to kinds of stars 
and kinds of animals, as when we say that the asterisk is a star or that the dolphin is 
a remarkable animal. No individual stars or animals arc referred to here. Notice that 
we may even say that Napoleon and Hitler faced the same winter when they tried lo 
invade Russia. 
7 The number of partitions of a kind with n individual instances coincides with the number of 
partitions of a set of n elements -and hence with the nth tenn in the Bell sequence of numbers. 
See Gardner (1978) for a delighlful piece on this versatile sequence. 
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That individuations are the singulative denotations which come most readily to 
mind is of little consequence -at least if we are concerned with semantic com-
petence rather than with semantic performance. The relevant issue is whether parti-
tions other than individuations are possible or not. The primacy of individuations 
over other partitions may then follow from other considerations -say the fact that 
reference to proper individuals occurs more often than reference to proper kinds. 
Similar points can he made if we focus on partitions other than individuations. 
For, not all such partitions come equally readily to mind. Some partitions involve 
"natural kinds" and thus seem "more natural" than others. It might thus be thought 
that singulatives should only he able to denote "natural partitions". But naturalness 
is not something that semantics should decide. On the contrary, natural languages 
allow us to refer to all kinds -including the false, the unnatural. and the perverse. 
To make them undenotable is to demand too much of language and too little of other 
systems of knowledge and belief. Singulativcs should he able to denote all 
partitions -al least in principle. 
Let us return now to xishba 'piece of wood'. The move from individuations 
to partitions was originally motivated by this mass singulative. The same point can 
he made, however, with every other mass singulative. Instead of making the point 
thus, let us focus more closely on the gloss 'piece of wood' given by Erwin (1963, 
166) for xishba. Notice that there arc many ways of splitting wood into pieces. 
Indeed, given the view of mass reference adopted for this study, there will be 
uncountably many such ways. But all such partitions should be equally possible 
denotations for xishba. We must therefore he prepared to allow an uncountable 
infinity of partitions as potential denotations of a singulative! 
But it might be objected that woodkind may be partitioned into instances other 
than pieces. Indeed, it seems clear that a piece of wood must be spatially continuous 
(no two logs in our pile, for example, should count as one piece). Kinds, on the 
other hand, need not be spatially continuous (oak, for example, is a kind of wood 
which is widely scattered throughout the world). It follows that there arc ways to 
split wood into subkinds which cannot count as pieces of wood. Surely here, the 
objection would go, the proposed assignment of partitions to singulatives is too 
general. 
The point would have to be conceded -at least if we must gloss xishba as 
'piece of wood'. But what if xishba could he glossed as 'instance of wood' 
instead? Unfortunately, the evidence for glossing it one way or the other is not easy 
to find, and must await further research. In any event, similar problems will be 
posed by all mass singulatives which are glossed in terms of highly nonarhitrary 
instances. Consider for example the collectives burr 'wheat' and baqar 'cattle' of 
Classical Arabic. Their singulatives are, respectively, burrat 'a grain of wheat' and 
baqarat 'a cow, bull, or ox' (cf. Howell 1900, 1057f). These singulativcs denote 
partitions which are far from arbitrary; they denote rather salient partitions of a kind 
instead. 
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Or consider what has been traditionally called the 'singulative of specification' 
-the use of the singulativc to refer to a dish or portion of any food, as in orizzat ·a 
dish of rice', samakat 'a dish of fish', lahmat 'a portion of meat', andjubnat 'a por-
tion of cheese' (cf. Wright 1933, 147). Here too, the partition denoted by the sin-
gulative is highly nonarbitrary. Again, our proposals for the singulative are hardly 
strong enough to identify, in each case, the partition denoted by the singulative. 
None of these examples is necessarily problematic for our proposals. First, it 
must be decided whether the glosses are indeed as nonarbitrary as usually given -
whether the glosses should not instead be in terms of 'instances'. But even if the 
glosses are accurate, the case could still be made that the proposals should be 
allowed to stand: the proposals would then have to be complemented by principles, 
drawn from other systems of knowledge and belief, which would assign a higher 
"selectional probability" to a partition by grains in the case ofburrat, by actual 
bovines in the case of baqarat, and by servings in the case of orizzat, salllllkat, and 
so on. 
Let us turn now to issues of formulation. How exactly, should our proposal 
be casted? We begin to answer this question by observing that the partitions in (9) 
can be partially ordered in terms of coarseness. Thus, (9a) is the coarsest, (9e) is 
the finest, and (9b)-(9d) are somewhere in between (and in no particular order of 
coarseness with respect to each other). Diagrammatically, the situation is as shown 
in (10), where every upward path relates some partition to a coarser one. 
(10) {a+b+c] 
w 
~ 
{a, b+c/ {b, a+c/ {c, a+b} 
{a, b. c} 
But coarseness in (10) represents genericity. Thus, the top node of (10) represents 
the most generic partition of a+b+c, while the bottom node thereof represents its 
most specific partition. The partitions ordered in between are intermediate in 
genericity (and incomparable with each other in this respect). 
Now, let us recall that {a+b+c} may serve as the denotation of the collective 
beei) 'eggs'. But as indicated in (9a). {a+b+c} is also a partition of a+b+c. This 
means that the singulative beei]a '(an) egg' and the collective beei) 'eggs' are similar 
in that both denote partitions of a kind. Beei}a and beer} differ, however, in that the 
former denotes a more refined partition than the latter. 
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As it turns om. the set of the partitions of any kind can be partially ordered in 
terms of genericity.~ Collective denotations will always be the coarsest partitions of 
a kind, while singulativc denotations will always be refinements tht:reof. The 
prnposals of this scctinn thus follow from ( 11 ). where: a refinement junction is 
simply an op(:ration which rdincs a pa11i1ion. 
(11) Singulativc suffixes denote refinement functions. 
To sec this, let us take ( 11) in conjunction with the fact, mentioned a hove\ that a 
singulative is a noun which is derived from a collcctiw hy the addition of a 
singubtivc suffix. For if we do, then the simplest way to comhinL' the: denotations 
of a singulativc suffix and a colk.-llvc stem will he for the former to operate un the 
latter and produce the desired rcfinemcm of a generic partition. The interpretation of 
the count singulative bt'f',)a '(an) egg' may therefore proceed as indicated in (12). 
Herc we assume a universe of discourse in which a, b. c arc the only prnpcr 
indiviJuals which an.: eggs. 
In addition, the interpretation of the mass singulativc xi1h/,a 'piece of wood', may 
proc,xd as indicated in (13), where we assume that a, b, .. .,j are ten h•gs which 
constitute woodkind.9 
(13) Oxish!}{JJ Ual([xishahl) {a, h. c. ii. c.j, g. h. i.j} 
The singulativc morpheme will thus he able to sclc,.:t ,·irher the units or the 
pieces which partition a kind. This double effect of the singulative has been recog-
niz,·d by Arabic grammarians. We haw s.:en that Erwin ( 1963, 166) takes the sin-
gulativcs of Iraqi Arahie to rekr either to "a specific quantity of the suhstanCl'", or 
dsc to "an individual mcmhcr of the collc..:tion". El,ewhere ( 1963, 174), he takes 
them to rL'kr either to "a singll' unit" or else w "a piece uf the dL•signated material". 
Ak,ng the same lines, Mitchell (195(1, 94) describes the unit nouns of Caircne 
Arabic as referring to "one or a piece (1f a larger whole". As to Classical Arahic, 
Wright (I 933, 147) oh,ervcd that singulJtives designate either "one individual out 
of a genus, or one pan of a whole that consists of several similar parts", 
The doubll' dk..:t of the singulative <.:an be nicdy illustrated hy the ambiguous 
singulative dijoaja. For, when interprt:tL'd as a partition of a kind uf hird, its 
8 ln fact the set of partition, of any kind fonns a complete la nice when taken in conj unction 
with inc relation of refinement (cf. Gratzcr 1978. l'J2). 
9 Inddentally, refinement functions are defined only for partition, of a kind, and no partition of 
any kind can ever he empty I the definition of constitution prcvmt;; tire empty set Imm constituting 
any kmd in a universe of discourse whidr constitutes a mereology with the relation of install· 
tiation). This means that mcaninpful singulativc.s mu,t derive from nonvacuous collectives. 
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denotation proceeds along the lines of (12), but when interpreted as a partition of a 
kind of food, iL, denotation parallels (l 3) instead. When taken in the latt.cr sense, it 
constitutes an example of the "singulative of specification" mentioned above. 
Finally, it will not have escaped the reader that the flexibility of our analysis 
of the singulative is predicated on the availability of a multiplicity of senses for the 
singulative suffix. It is indeed assumed that the singulative suffix may have as 
many senses as there are refinement functions (a more proper notation might thus 
assign different subindiccs to the singulative morphemes in (12) and ( 13) above). 
In any case, it is in the semantics of the singulative morpheme that nominal 
semantics reflects the severe indeterminacy in the partition of a kind we have 
alluded to above. 
4. The Singular 
In addition to the dcrivational opposition between the singulative and the 
collective, the nominal system of Arabic recognizes an inflectional contrast between 
the singular, the dual, and the plural. which we will now address. We will di.,cuss 
the singular in this section and !caw the dual and the plural for the next. 
Following the pioneering work of Link (1983), a noun is usually said to he 
semantically singular if and only if it denotes a set of proper individuals of the 
universe of discourse. Yet, in light of facts mentioned in the preceding section 
concerning the ability of the English singular lo refer lo proper kinds, ( 14) seems a 
preferable alternative. Further evidence to this effect can be drawn from quantifica-
tion over kinds, from the taxonomic interpretation of mass plurals, and from the 
semantics of definite generics. 10 
( 14) 	 A noun is semantically singular if and only if it denotes a pairwise disjoint 
suhsct of the universe of discours,'. 
As might be expected, a subset of the universe of discourse will be pairwise disjoint 
if and only if no two clements thereof overlap. And, since the uni verse of discourse 
is complete in the sense of (4). every pairwise disjoint subset of the universe will 
constitute a kind --at least if the subset is not empty. 11 This means that every 
pairwise disjoint subset of the universe will be a partition, and that the categories of 
the singulatiVc and the singular do not contrast in meaning. But this is as desired; 
Arabic singulatives are universally regarded as singular. 
Naturally, every set of proper individuals of the universe of discourse will be 
pairwise disjoint (proper individuals would <1therwisc have their overlap as 
IO See Ojeda (in pres~) for di,-u:,sion. 
11 II should he noticcc.J that the empty sub,cl of the universe of c.Jisrnursc i, pairwise disjoint: the 
empty subset cannot have any clements -let alone two distinct elements which overlap. This 
should be as desired: it should be possible for semantically singular nouns to denote !he empty 
subset of !he universe. 
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instances other than themselves). But not every pairwise disjoint set will be a set of 
proper individuals of the universe (consider again any one of the partitions of 
woodkind mentioned above). It follows that (14) represents a proper generalization 
of the usual characterization of singular nouns. 
Finally, notice that not every singular noun will be a singulative; there arc 
many nouns in Arabic whose singular simply does not incorporate a singulative 
morpheme. In fact, the singulativc morpheme attaches, for the most part, to 
collectives which belong to a particular semantic field. According to Wright (1933, 
l 47f), singulatives are "almost entirely restricted [ ... ] to created or natural objects. 
Examples of artificial or manufactured objects are very rare" .12 
5. The Dual and the Plural 
A semantically singular noun of Arabic, whether singulative or not, will 
generally have both a dual and a plural counterpart. Consider again the singulative 
beer)a 'egg'. We have seen that it will be singular -at least on semantic grounds. 
As such, it will have a dual beei}teen 'two eggs' and a plural beer}aat 'eggs'. To 
determine the semantic import of these forms we will interpret the dual and the 
plural inflections as follows. 
(15) 	 a. The dual inflection denotes the function which assigns, to each pairwise 
disjoint F~E. the set {l:(G): G~F and IGI = 2/. 
b. 	 The plural inflection denotes a function which assigns, to each pairwise 
disjoint F~E. the set (D,G): 
For let us suppose with tradition that the dual and the plural are derived from the 
singular.I' The interpretations of bee9tee11 'two eggs' and beer)aat 'eggs' may now 
proceed as indicated in (16). 
(16) a. 	 [bee91eenJ=[een]([beer;}a])={lJ,G):G~[beec)a)and IGl=2/. 
b. 	 [beei}aat] =[aat]([beei}a]) ={l:(G): Gk[beer}a)) 
The dual beer}teen may thus denote the set of kinds constituted by the doubleton 
subsets of the set of individual eggs of the universe of discourse. The plural 
beer}aat, on the other hand, may simply denote the set of kinds constituted by the 
arbitrary subsets of the set of individual eggs of the universe of discourse. It will 
not escape the reader that the denotation of a plural noun will contain the denotation 
------··------
12 llowcll (1900, 1062[) report, on the helicf that in this, Grammar reflects the Order of Creation 
-for just as natural things were created hy God in the species and divided t,y Man in individuals, 
so they are named t,y collectives from which singulatives are then derived. And just as artificial 
things must he manufactured individually before they can be put into groups, so they are named by 
singulars from which plurals are then constructed. 
13 Sec McCarthy and Prince (1990) for phonological evidence that plurals in Arabic must derive 
from singulars rather than from their consonantal roots. 
31S 
of its dual counterpart. In addition. it will include the denotation of its singular 
counterpart: 
(17) 	 [bn?Jteen],;;;;[beei)aatl 
[beei}a) <;;;[beeihat] 
Since the converses of these containments do not hold in general. rhe plural is the 
unmarked member in th,' Arabic contrast ofnumber. 
To illustrate the semantics of the dual and the plural, let us once again assume 
a universe of discourse with exactly three eggs a, b, c. Here the dual beei}tl'l'/1 will 
denote the set /a+h. a+c. b+c} enclosed in (18), while the plural hee(laar will 
denote the set /a. b, c. a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}, also enclosed in ( 18). 
(18) a+h+c 
a+c 
a b C 
lbeeqteen J 
= [ bt'erl:/iJt I 
Evidence that the plural is in general unmarked with respect to the singular has been 
provided in McCawley (1968), Mufwene (1980), Roberts (1986), Krifka (1987), 
and Ojeda (in press). But similar points can he made with respect to the plural and 
the dual. Thus, in his grammar of Syrian Arabic, Cowell (I 964, 167) observed that 
The dual need not he used every time two of anything arc referred to. If the 
number happens to he two hut is beside the point, or to he taken for 
granted. then the plural is used, just as in English: 'iando hanat /,ass 'He 
has daughters only' (applicable though he may have exactly two); 1-man!o 
dayye? fand Pktaf The coat is tight in the shoulders'. Cf. fondo hantan 
bass 'He only has two daughters'; 1-man!u dayyc? fand "1-k.nlen The 
coat is tight in both shoulders'. 
In reference to things that normally come in a pair. the dual is not ordinarily 
used in contrast to the plural. but only in .:ontrast to the singular I...J Note 
that the forms ?:1lren, 'feet, legs', ?iden 'hands, arms', fcntn 'eyes', and 
?adanen 'ears' are not duals in colloquial usage, but plurals: ?arhaf ?;;:l.ren 
'four legs'. The true duals of these words have connective t f... ] before the 
suffix: ?.,t"rten, ?i11en, fenten, ?;:,r.fJ111en. 
3 ll1 
Further evidence for the unmarkt:dnrss of the dual with respect to the plural is 
provided hy Universal 34 of Circenhcrg ( 1963, 94): No language has a dual unless 
it has a plural. Also rekvant is the general tendency towards the elimination of the 
dual documented rn the languages of the world (cf. Vc.ndrycs 1937 ). 
But having argued that the plural is unmarked with respect to the singular and 
l11,: dual, we must JJ.:krmwlcdgc, h,·rc as elsewhere, the effccts of a rathcr general 
process wherehy the unmarked term of an opposition can come to denote the 
semantic difference hctwcen thL'. marked and the unmarked terms. Cast in rhc 
original Pragucan terms, this is the process whereby an expression which has a 
)!Cncrnl mi:anin)! (Ge.rnm1/,etl1•ur11n;.:) develops a specific meaning (Grundhnlrn-
tung).14 I-knee the plural, which can enc,,mpass the mc:anings of the singular and 
the dual, can come to denote the set of kinds constituted hy strictly more than two 
individuals. It is. thercfon.::, unly whL'.n the plural is tak<:n in it~ .,pecifie .,ens<: that it 
is .. a form constructed to indicate number excPeding t1,-o'' (cf. Howell l 9()(), 862). 
To illu.,tratc, h·t us turn lHJc·l: again to a universe ,,f discourse with but three eggs 11, 
h, c. When taken in its general meaning, the plural beeikwt denotes the set {I(GJ: 
G,;Jhee(Jo]) enclosed in (l8l. Whc·n taken. howl'vcr. in its specific meaning, this 
plural denotes the set {a+b+cj encl,•sed in (8) alwve. 
It goes wiLhout saying that the unmarkcdncss of the plural we have just 
argued for pertains only to content. not to form. Judging from the shape~ of th,'. 
singulatiVL'., the dual, and the plural. there seem to hL: no grounds for deciding 
which, if any, sll()uld have the unmarked lurm. The issuc is ckar only for the 
collective, whose form is typically contained in that of singulatives, duals, and 
(snund) plurals 
:"low. it might k objected that our prop,isals confuse kinds and groups. 
Thus, it might be thought that plurality pc11ains to groups, not to kinds. whereas 
collectivity involves kinds, not groups. As we Sl\'. it, this is a distinction without a 
difference. Following Quine (1969). we adopt a strongly extensional view of kinds: 
we ,imply regard kinds as groups. But thL' critic may reply that this extensional 
view of kinds cannot he right -after all, difforent kinds may happen to have the 
same'. instances (cL the species /lomu and /101110 sapiens) and, cunversdy. 
different sets ol instances may correspond to thc same kind (cf. the set of whales 
with J\lohy lh.:k and the sci or whaks without Moby Dick). This rcply, however, 
ash too much of extensional ohjccts and too little of intensional objects. By 
assumption. kinds arc individuals. As such, they will save as the hasis for 
individual concepts -say functions from possihk worlds to individuals. What the 
critic took to he kinds should he kind concepts instead -say functions from 
possible worlds t<i kinds/groups. Now different kind concepts may correspond to 
the same kinds/groups and, convcrsdy, different kinds/groups may correspond to 
the same concept. 
14 See Waugh ( I 'J76. 94-'JR) and lhe references cited lhcrc. 
:,;17 
In any even!, the view of kinds we have adopted here is not grounded on 
philosophical conviction but rather on linguistic fact. Notice that Arabic collectives 
are characterized as denoting either groups or kinds. Thus, on the one hand, 
collectives have hcen taken to denott: "a class or mass of things" (cf. Ahdcl-Massih 
et al. 1979, 49). On the other hand, they haw been taken to denote "the species as a 
whole" (Harrell 1962, 78), and as having "generic reference" (Holes 1990, I49). 
"!be two aspects or the collective denotation are brought together by Wright ( 1933, 
147), who describes the collective as expressing "the genus or whole". ll follows 
that to distinguish between groups and kinds would only lead us to miss a 
generali7.ation concerning the semantics of the Arabic collective. Similar points can 
be made about rhc singulativc. Cowell (1964, 297) points om, for example, that "a 
singulativc designates an individual unit or instance" (emphasis supplied). And 
further evidence for collapsing groups and kinds comes from multal and complex 
plurals, as we will presently see. 
6. The Paucal and the Multal 
A plural in Ch,sical Arabic is either sound (pluralis sww1') or broken (plum/is 
fractus). A plural is sound if it is formed by suffixation onto a usually unchanged 
singular stem; a plural is instead broken if it is formed primarily by the alteration of 
the singular stem. Interestingly. one and the same singular may sometimes have 
both a sound and a broken plural. Consider for instance the collective /;afar 'trees'. 
Its singulative sagarar has two plurals. One of them is sound (.sagariil); the other is 
broken f?a{g(Ir).15 
Broken plurals are formed according to more than thirty patterns of daunting 
intricacy (cf. Wright I 933, 199-234). Of these patterns, there are four which 
govern the formation of the "plurals of paucity" (pluralis pauciratis). The rest 
produce "plurals of rnultitudt'.". 'Jbc plurals of paucity and multitude arc so called 
because whenever used contrastively, the plural of paucity is "used only of persons 
and things which do not exceed ten in number" (Wright 1933, §307), while the 
plural of multitude ''properly indicates what is above ten to infinity" (Howell 1900. 
885). Sometimes the plurals of paucity and multitude are not used contrastively. 
This happens when a singular has hut one plural. In such case, that plural denotes 
in accordance with (15b). 
In Classical Arabic. the opposition between pam:ity and multitude was not 
pertinent to the sound plural: "the two sound plurals [i.e. the masculine and the 
feminine] are common to paucity and multitude", writes Howell (19()(), 886), "and 
apparently they denote unrestricted pluralization, without regard to paucity or 
multitude, so that they arc applicable to both." The semantics given in (15b) is thus 
appropriately general for the sound plural of Classical Arabic. Now precise 
15 See Fischer (1972, §83). 
318 
semantics for the paucal and the multal plurals arc called for. They are given in 
(19). 
(19) 	 a. The paucal inflection denotes a function which assigns, to each pairwise 
disjoint fl;;;E, the set/L(G): G;;;; F and IGI ~JO}. 
b. 	 The multal inflection denotes a function which assigns, to each pairwise 
disjoint F<;;;;,E, the set/I{GJ: G;;;;Fand IGI > JO}. 
Incidentally, whenever the multal inflection is added onto a singular which denotes 
a set with less than eleven clements, the empty set will be denoted. This should be 
as desired. 
The opposition between the multal and the paucal is likewise neutralized in the 
collective, which "is applied to the few and the many" (cf. Howell 1900. 1053). 
And even though multitude may he "imported" from the collective, "the import of 
multitude is not from the expression, but only from its indicated [sic], since it is 
indicative of genus, which imports multitude". The collective is not plural, as it 
"docs not indicate unirs". Rather, the expression is constituted "to denote whar 
consritutes the special quiddity" (cf. Howell 1900, !054). 
To illustrate the distinction between the paucal and the mullal, let us return to 
the two plurals of sagarat 'tree' mentioned above. As we have indicated, one of 
these plurals (.ll,agarl7t) is sound. It thus denotes the set of trees "without regard to 
paucity or multitude". The other (lh.~.r[clr), is broken. Moreover, it is a plural of 
paucity. It thus denotes the set of groups of ten trees or less. Clearly, 
(20) U?asl[r1r]<;;;;,ff sa.'fara1) 
In the modem vernaculars, few sound plurals alternate with a hrokcn plural. 
Mitchell (1956, 94) points out, for example, that hrokcn alternatives to sound 
plurals are "comparatively rare" in Cairene Arabic, and Cowell (I 964, :169) states 
that a contrast hctwcen a sound and a broken plural holds only "sometimes". Yet, 
whenever a sound plural alternates with a hroken plural, the sound plural is inter-
preted as a plural of paucity. As a consequence of this, the hroken plural, whose 
general meaning (Gesamrbedeurung) is that of an unrestricted plural. develops the 
appropriate specific meaning (Grundbedeurung) --namely that of a plural of 
multitude. 16 
In Cairene Arabic for example, Mitchell ( 1962, 42) contrasts the sound plural 
sagrmiar '(a few) trees', with the hroken plural ?asgaar '(different kinds oO trees', 
and says that the former is "a little plural", while the latter is "a hig plural". Similar 
contrasts can he drawn from Syrian Arabic (cf. Cowell 1964, :169). Herc the sound 
plural samakr7r 'fish, fishes' contrasts with the broken plural ?asmlik '(many or 
----·----
] 6 It would be interesting lO dctcnninc why the vernaculars use the sound plural for paucity and 
!he broken plural for multitude -especially in light of the fact !hat broken plurals in m- were 
characteristic of plurals of paucity in the Classical language (cf. Fischer 1972, §100). 
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various) fish'; the sound plural d;,bbanat 'flies' is distinguished from the broken 
plural clabab1n '(many or various) flies', and the sound plural miizdt 'waves' is set 
against the broken plural lamwdz '(many or extensive) waves'. 
Along parallel lines, some singular nouns of Maltese may have two plurals. 
One of these plurals is "determinate"; the other "indeterminate". Determinate plurals 
are used with numerals from two to ten; indeterminate plurals arc used "of things 
belonging to a certain class taken in general" (Sutcliffe 1936, §§21 b, 55d), 
presumably when they arc more than ten. Examples include P/f 'thousand', which 
has both a determinate plural elel (cf. sitt ele('six thousand'), and an indeterminate 
plural elu((cf. elul ta. kotba 'thousands of books'). 
It should not escape the reader that at least some of these broken plurals may 
refer either to groups or to kinds. The clearest documented cases come from Syrian 
Arabic where, as we have seen, we find broken plurals like lasmiik '(many or 
various) fish' and cla/Jabin '(many or various) flies'. More generally, the plurals of 
multitude arc said to "indicate abundance or variety" (cf. Cowell I 964, 369). 
Again, to distinguish between groups and kinds would only lead us to miss a 
generalization concerning, in this case, the semantics of the multal. 
Finally, evidence that the broken plural is truly the unmarked or unrestricted 
plural is provided hy the fact that some broken plurals can actually he used either as 
plurals of paucity or as plurals of multitude even when they alternate with 
perfectly legitimate plurals of paucity. Consider for example the broken plural wriiq 
'leaves'. It may he used either as a plural of abundance or as a plural of paucity 
even though it has in the sound plural waraliit a perfectly legitimate paucal counter-
part. Or consider the broken plural wriid 't1owcrs'. It may he used either as a 
paucal or as a multal even though it has a paucal counterpart in the sound wardc7t. 
These broken plurals arc thus rightly called "all-purpose plurals" (cf. Cowell I 964, 
369). 17 
7. The Plural of the Plural 
Rut the complexities of Arabic number do not stop here. Some broken plurals 
of Classical Arabic can "assimilate" to singulars, and can then he dualizcd and 
pluralized. The effect of such secondary formations is the denotation of dualities or 
pluralities of groups or kinds: 
Necessity sometimes leads to pluralization, as to dualization of the plural. 
The broken plural is somctimcs pluralized, whcn they mean to intensify the 
1 7 lnci<lcntally, acrnr<ling to Cowell ( I 964, :lW), 1J1e broken plurals ol multitude arc the plurals 
ol collectives (while the sound plur;Us ol paucity arc the plurals ol singulativcs). It is unlikely, 
however, 1J1at 1J1is attractive i<lea can he maintained in view ol 1J1e fact, noted by Cowell himself, 
that 1J1erc arc no collectives for "all-purpose" broken plurals like sai:aver 'cigarettes', .xivam 'tents', 
anti J.zay(1ya 'snakes'. Moreover) given 11,c proposals we have advanced conccn1ing plurals and 
collectives, every collective would he its own plural, so U1c plural ol a collective would he 
indistinguishable from 1J1e collective it.sell. 
multiplication, and w notify different kinds of that sort. hy assimilation ut' 
the plural expression to the singular (llowell 1900, 1071 ). 
Consickr for instarn.:c the singular rah/un 'tribe'. It has a broken plural 7arhurun 
'association ot' trib.:-s' which has. in turn. a hroken plural lariihi/11 'associations of 
tribes'. Or consider yadun 'hand'. It has a plural laydin 'assistance' whose plural is 
lity{Idin 'assistances·. Or consider, finally. haladun 'village·, with plural bilc7dun 
'land·. and secondary plural buldiJnun 'lands' (cf. Fischer 1972, § 106). 
As these examples make clear, thL: meanings of the primary plurals arc not 
entirely predictable from the meaning of plurality (15b). aml the meanings of the 
corresponding st,:ms. 18 It may thus be apprnpriat,: to regard the first plurali,,ation as 
a dciivational pn,c,:.,s \Vhich produces a new sinpliar out of an old one (cf. Kuhn 
1982. 62). It seems more likely, however, that the new singular arises 
diachronically rather than synchronically -i.e. as the historical reanalysis of a 
plural as a singular (cf. Rrockelmann 1908, §239c). In either case, we have two 
singulars; one is basic and the other is derived. Basic singulars are rah/un 'tribe', 
_vadun 'hand', and baladun 'village' Derived singulars arc 7arh1qun 'association of 
tribes'. 7(/ydin 'assistance'. and /Jiliidun 'Lind'. A "plural of the plural" is simply 
the result of plurali.ring a derivul singular in confonnity witJ1 {151,). 
But how is the meaning of a basic singular related to the meaning of a singular 
derived therefrom? To answer this question, let us hear in mind that a singular must 
always denote a pairwi,;e disjoint set. But every pairwise disjoint set is either the 
partitinn of some kind or else the empty set. A basic singular will therefore d.::note 
either the pa11ition uf some kind or else the empty set. A derived singular faces the 
same disjunction. I! will denote either the partition of some kind or else the empty 
set. Interestingly, however. if a basic singular and its derived counterpart arc not 
empty, they will dem•tc different pa11itim1s of the same kiwi. What is more, we may 
claim that 
(2 1) Every derived singular denotes a coarser partition than the one denoted by its 
hasic singular snun.:e. 
Typically, a basic singular will denote the individuation ,if a kind --the ~et of 
proper individuals which instantiate a kind. A derived singular, on the other hand, 
will tend to denote a coarser partition of a kind instead. Thus rah{un 'tribe' will 
denote the trivial partition of trihekind imo individual tribes while larh11r1in 'associ-
ation of tribes' will denote the nontrivial partition of tribekind into tribal associa-
tions. The rda1ion between till' drnotations of the two singulars will thu~ he as 
indicated in (21 ). 
18 To describe the semamics of larhutun. Fischer gives 'cinige Sippen = Sippenverharnl'; for 
it1ydin, he gives 'einigc !landc, Hilfelti,cung': for hiliidun he gives 'Omchaften =Land'. If these 
were Lrue equations. U1ey would be mmecessary. 
To visualize the relations hetwccn the derivatives of mh/11t1 'trihe'. kt us 
;b!,,Ulllc a univers.: oi discoursL: \Hth nine trib.:" ,,. b, ... , i, con,,tituting three 
associations. Relative to this universe llf disu,ursc. U,c dcrivativi.:,; of rr1h[1m 'trihc' 
may dcnotL' a., diagramcd in {22). 
o+b+c+d+e+j+g+h+i 
~~
a+-b+c-td+-,+f a+h+-c+g+h+i d+e tf+gt h+i = il ?arflhiw I 
il?arhutun I 
a b C d e f g h =Urahwn I 
Naturally, a partition will usually have many coars.:r counterpart,;_ Thi, mean, that 
the dcnotati,,n of a clerived plural will not always OL' determined gi\cn the 
denotation of its basic singular. (21) only ,'(!f1Strnins the semantics of derived 
singulars; it docs not dt'lermine it. In addition. an association of tribes is more than 
a group of tribes; an assistance is more than a collci.:tion of hands, and a land is 
more than a bundle of villages. Dc!rived plurals may therefore specialize in meaning 
and rcft:r only to particular groups, collcctilHlS ur bundle,. But this due, nut detract 
from the fat:t that th..: final. specialized. meaning required an intermediary co:.irsen-
ing of thl' initi.il n11:a11ing. It is only this im,·rnwdiatc ~tag,· - 01w which is IW\'crth,· 
less rcnirtlcd in the morph,ilogy - that (21) s,:cks tn tlcsc1i he. 
In any t:vent. the r,,atler will han: noticed that both th,, plural of the plural nnd 
the dual of the plural again argue for collapsing groups anti kinds. As Howell 
( I 900, I07 l) put it in th,, quutation above, th,:sc c,implcx formations ,:ithcr 
"intensify th,· multiplication" or else ''notify different kinds". Plurality may there-
fore convey either a multiplicity of groups or a multiplicity of kinds. Sec ais,) the 
following section, where the Jual of tht: plural is tlescrihctl as denoting "the duality 
of the species or the sd' (fischn 1972. § 108b, emphasis added). 
It should b,· adckd that s<mw plural plurals can hr plur:tli/cd y,'t again. The' 
singular ftrq{lt 'sect'. for 1:xampk. ha~ a pluralftnu1. a plural plural ?ufrilq, and a 
rlural plural plural ?afr7r1q (Wri1!ht l911. 212). Such trc:blc formations can b..: 
straightforwardly accommodated hy our proposal;;: firqot may denote the ,ct of 
individual sects. This set is a panition of scr.:tkind. It is, mort:uvcr, a rc!'int:mcnt of 
the partitinn dc:nott:d 'oyjimq. .,.,hich is in turn a rcfim•mcnt of the partiti,1n dGnotcd 
hy ?a frihJ. The triple plural ?afririiJ denotes hut the: closure of the !attn. Further 
examples of tripk plurality ..:an he found in Wright (193.1. 23 If) as well as in 
Howell (I 900, 1077f) -· --who also records the fact that "some disapprove" of such 
formations ... 
Finally, we should notice that if we take plurals in their specific meanings 
(Grundbedeutungen). then it is indeed true that "the plural plural is not 
unrestrictedly applicabk to less than nine, as the plural of the singular is not 
applicahk to less than three, except hy a trope" and, when triple plurali1.ation is 
considered, "the least number necessarily implied would he Twenry-sevm" (Howell 
1900, 1077). As has been illustrated in (22). each specific plural would require at 
least three elcm,:nts in its soun;e_ 1'1 
8. The Dual of the Plural 
Similar ,onsid,:rations apply to the dual of the plural. Thus. corresponding to 
the singularjamfllun 'male camel', there is the pluraljimiihm 'herd of male camels', 
whost: dual is jim(I/rini 'two herds of male t:amels'; corresponding to the singular 
rian?wn 'spear·. there is a plural rim1TIJu11 '[L·lump of] spears'. whose dual is 
rimfil:,cini 'two clumps of spears'; corresponding to the singular a,,lun 'fundamental 
principle', there is the plural u,,ii/1111 '[group of] fundamental principles', whose 
dual is tt,l"l7liini 'two [groups of) fundamental principlt:s. namely those of theology 
and law' (cf. Howell 1900, 855f, 1085; Wright 1933, 191; Fischer 1972, §108h). 
Herc we again have derived singulars which denote partitions other than 
individuations: jimiilun dt'notcs a partition of the kind of male t:amels into herds. 
rimiil1ii11i denotes a partition of spcarkind into dumps, and l(l"lilun denotes a par-
tition of fundamental principks into groups. Each one of these partitions can he 
dualizcd. It thus hccomes an expression which denotes "die Zweihcit dcr Gallung 
oder Menge" (Fi~t;;her 1972. §I08h); a form with the interpretation nf tw1> rnllcc-
tions, two parties, two bodies, or two troops, of the objects in question (cf. Howdl 
1900, 855; Wright 1933, [90). The semantics of the derivatives ofjamalun can he 
visualized by means of (23), whne we assume a universe of discourse with nine 
male camels a, b, ... , i rnnstituting three herds. 
Closely related to the dual of the plural is the case of the dual of a singular "to 
the meaning of which th,: idea of plurality attaches" (Wright l933, 234). Consider 
for instance ibilun "herd of camels' and .~anamun 'l1ock of shc,:p or goats' (= 
German Kleinviehherde). Their respc,tive duals arc ?ibiliini 'two herds of camels', 
and gananuini 'two flocks of sheep or goal~' (cf. Howdl 1900, 855; Wright 1933, 
179, I 90f; Fischer 1972. !i* 85. 108h ). As to their plurals. they an: '/cibiJ/ 'h,:rds of 
camels' and lagni1m '!locks of sheep or goats' (cf. Brockelmanm I960, *77h). The 
semantics of the derivatives of libi/un can he visualized hy means of (24), where 
I</ Wrigh1 tl933. 212) indicate, tltal scc(•ndary plurals can be used either when the ohjccts 
dcnoteu are at lca,t nine in numhcr, or when their number is imlcfinilc -according, prcsumahly, to 
whether the ohjcct, arc enumerated or not (cf. Flcisch I ()6 I. §6:ip ). 
we assume a universe of discourse with .,ix camels a, /J, ... , f constituting three 
herds. 
(21) a+ln-c+d t r+f+ g+h+i 
a+b+c+d+e+f a+b+c+s+h+i J+e+f+g+h+i = [jimillti1i 1 
= [iimiilunl 
= [iamalw11 
(2"1) 
a+b+c+d+e+f 
a+b+c+d a+b+e+f c+ri+e+f = ft?ihihini J 
= l?ihilun] 
a b ' d e f 
The difference between the dual of the plural and the dual of the singular "to the 
meaning of which the ilka of plurality attaches" lies in the fact that only the former 
involves an intermediary plural ----even if only etymologically. This is reflected in 
the pm.:eding diagrams hy having more than two camels make up a herd in (2~), as 
three is the lower hound for a proper plural. 
Again, the dc:rived singulars inl'olved in the dual of the plural cannot he 
determined hy (2 I); they ,·an unly be c,,nstraincd hy it. The: reasons for thi., ,tr\.' the 
same as the ones advanced in th,: case of the plural of the plural. First. a partition 
will tend t,, have m(lJ'C than on,: coarser counterpart. Sc-:ond. the derived singular 
involved in the dual of the plural usually involves semantic specialization. Thus, 
herds, clumps. and flocks arc more than .,implc groups/kinds of ohjccts. Along 
similar lines, the piinciplcs of theology and law den, 1ted hy 11,iiiliJ11i are unly two of 
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the groups of principles that the derived singular u;iilun '[group of] fundamental 
principles' may denote. Yet, (21) is not otiose; it constrains the selection of the 
(semantic) singular whose specialiwtion will dualize. 
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